Although health insurance exchanges are a growing source of individual coverage, little is known about consumer behavior on these exchanges. While health insurance exchanges are intended to facilitate competition among insurers and make it easier for consumers to access insurance, understanding how consumers choose insurance plans is necessary for the design of these markets. We characterize demand on a health insurance exchange, including the type of plans individuals choose and how they respond to price. Previous work has noted the potential limits to consumer decision making ability in similar environments (Abaluck and Gruber 2011) . In a structural model of health plan choice, we consider the role of heterogeneity in preferences and whether consumers rely on simple rules of thumb.
We offer a first look at behavior on The full name is the Massachusetts Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, which run both the unsubsidized "Commonwealth Choice" market considered here, as well as a separate market called "Commonwealth Care" for people whose family income is below 300% of the federal poverty line. individual's marginal tax rate; there is no such subsidy on the exchange. However, when we use our estimated models to simulate the plans that would be chosen if prices were reduced to 70% of current levels, the fraction choosing bronze plans only falls slightly: from 63% down to 44% to 60%, depending on specification.
6 Note this analysis is only a rough approximation of the pricing difference between ESI and the exchange: the exchange has age-based pricing (while ESI does not), However, purchases on the exchange may differ for other reasons: for instance, since the median enrollee tenure in the Connector is about one year, individuals may be looking for "stop-gap" coverage while they wait for a preferable coverage source.
6 Even if prices were reduced to 40% of current levels, the fraction of individuals choosing bronze is predicted to be 22% to 57%, depending on specification.
A range of evidence suggests that people use heuristics to make difficult decisions (see Given the assumptions of the logit demand model, the probability person i purchases plan j is given by
which also gives plan enrollment shares .
Given the observed enrollment decisions, the components of the decision index can be estimated via maximum likelihood.
II. Empirical Results
[ Insert Table 2 Here] Table 2 Column 3 allows for heterogeneity in price sensitivity by allowing the price coefficient to vary by age. We impose a linear age trend in the price coefficient, though similar results are found when is allowed to vary by age categories. We find substantial variation in price sensitivity, with the youngest individual (age 27) being nearly twice as sensitive to price as a 64 year old: = -1.67 and -0.95, respectively. The minimum effect is still significant, in equivalent to a price reduction of $26/month for a 27 year-old and $46/month for a 64 year-old.
We allow for further heterogeneity in column 4 by letting the preference for tier vary by age. In column 5 by letting preference for plan vary by age, estimating 25 separate age trends. In both cases, substantial heterogeneity in price sensitivity remains.
However, in column 5, the minimum effect becomes insignificant and noisily measured.
[ Insert Table 3 Here] Table 3 also allows for heterogeneity in price sensitivity on unobservables: it estimates a random coefficients logit model (a.k.a. mixed logit), in which the premium coefficient takes on a distribution. We impose that coefficient follows a lognormal distribution, so consumers always dislike higher prices.
The results indicate substantial variation in price sensitivity even on unobservables, although our identification largely depends on the functional form we imposed. The estimated effect of being the minimum plan is now negative, though not statistically significantly different from zero. We have explored allowing the minimum effect (as well as the price coefficient) to both take on a distribution; in these cases the mean minimum effect is typically small and not statistically significant from zero. However, our ability to separately identify a distribution of both the price coefficient and the minimum effect is
limited.
There results demonstrate substantial evidence for price sensitivity. However, the evidence for the use of heuristics is weaker.
IV. Conclusions
We find that insurance plans consumers choose in an exchange setting are markedly different than demand in existing markets.
Therefore, we argue that studying consumer In addition, plans that are the cheapest in their area receive a substantial increase in enrollment. We argue that either a heuristic, such as "choose the cheapest plan" or consumer heterogeneity in preferences could rationalize the patterns we see in the data.
Consumer heterogeneity is a robust phenomenon in this data, and ignoring it will likely lead to misleading results. Ideally, however, models should be estimated that are flexible enough to incorporate both heterogeneity and decision rules that do not depend directly on preferences alone, such as heuristics. Notes: Sample: Analysis Sample. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. "Tier x Age Trend" includes a linear age trend in preference for each tier, and "Plan x Age Trend" includes a linear age trend in preference for each plan. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level. Notes: Sample: Analysis Sample. Results of a random coefficients logit model, in which the premium coefficient is constrained to follow a lognormal distribution at age 27, and shifted by the "shift mean" coefficient for older ages. Mean and standard deviation are of the premium coefficient distribution, transformed from the log normal. Estimation via maximum simulated likelihood using Stata's mixlogit add in. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level.
FIGURE 1 : AGE TRENDS IN CHOICE AND COST OF PLANS
Notes: Analysis Sample. Solid line shows the fraction of each age category choosing a bronze generosity plan. The dashed line shows the average monthly cost of a gold plan minus the average cost of a bronze plan, averaged over all enrollees in each age category. 
